北韓100元舊韓元換1元新韓元 vs 流亡中華民國土匪集團(台灣當局)4萬元舊台幣換1元新台幣

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政變、暴動…2012北韓掀風暴

2010-04 Web only 作者：經濟學人
相關關鍵字： 經濟學人
據報導，北韓處決了負責09年貨幣重整規畫的經濟部長朴南基。北韓於去年11月30日突然宣佈重新發行北韓元，100舊韓元換1新韓元；此舉除了造成混淆，更讓非正式私人市場陷入混亂，而許多北韓民眾的日常必需品都是來自私人市場。
北韓政府決定重新發行貨幣，最有可能的解釋是擔心失去對國家的掌控，藉由摧毀商人階級的存款，避免他們的權力坐大。但此舉卻意外造成必需品供應短缺和通膨突增，讓民眾前所未見地公開表達不滿。

幣值改革對一般北韓民眾極不公平，只有10萬元舊幣可以用100:1換新幣，超過此部分兌換比則為1000:1，讓存款幾近毫無價值。官方於12月28日禁止國內交易使用外幣，就連持有外國貨幣的精英份子也逃不過。南韓人權團體表示，目前北韓的米價比貨幣改革前高出11-12倍，國內交易禁用外幣後，實際匯率也從30新北韓元兌1美元，貶至300元兌1美元。

如果朴南基確實遭到處決，表示北韓政府認清貨幣改革是錯誤的決定，試圖找出代罪羔羊。金正日身體狀況不佳，據報導已經指任三子金正銀繼位；但這位20幾歲的兒子從未公開露面，如果政權轉移期間金正日突然過世，金正銀不一定會受到支持。

另一項重大挑戰則是衰敗的經濟。09年收成不佳，核武問題造成外援減少，糧食不足的情況再度惡化。此外，北韓政府訊息控管的漏洞越來越多，許多民眾已經發現外面的世界與北韓大為不同。南韓智庫認為金正日撐不過2012年，軍事政變、暴動、屠殺、戰爭都有可能發生。發生戰爭或許過於誇大，但也突顯北韓接下來的發展會為區域安全帶來重大威脅。（黃維德譯）

經濟學人英文原文

North Korea risk: Alert Regime's troubles a concern for the region

By THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT
From The Economist
Published: April 02, 2010

Amid rising public discontent, North Korea has reportedly executed a top official accused of botching a currency reorganisation undertaken in late 2009. There has been no independent confirmation of the report, first carried by South Korea's Yonhap news agency on March 18th. But if true, it would raise fresh doubts about social stability inside the long-isolated and impoverished country. And at a time when the North's autocratic regime is believed to be trying to engineer another dynastic succession, its shambolic handling of the country's already dire economy could set off a political crisis. Given the unpredictable nature of its supreme leader, Kim Jong-il, and his access to nuclear-weapons technolog*, such a scenario would also have ominous implications beyond North Korea's borders.

Scapegoat?

Quoting unnamed sources, Yonhap said Pak Nam-ki, who headed the finance and planning department of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), was shot dead by a firing squad in early March. Mr Pak, aged 77, had been a close economic adviser to Mr Kim, but was fired from his post in January after other senior party officials pinned the blame on him for the currency debacle. The official charge against him was that he had been 'the son of a big landlord who infiltrated the ranks of revolutionaries' to deliberately ruin the national economy.

Whether it was Mr Pak's idea or not, the redenomination did nearly wreck the North's economy. The government's surprise announcement on November 30th that it was reissuing the won with two zeros removed (ie, old Won100 = new Won1) plunged the populace into confusion. More critically, it threw into total disarray the country's unofficial private markets on which many North Koreans had come to depend for daily necessities (the communist system of public rationing had collapsed long ago). Merchants either refused to sell food and other goods, or hiked their prices to exorbitant levels. Protests erupted in many market centres, and a number of rioters were reportedly shot. The situation became so volatile that several top North Korean officials are believed to have apologised in public--a rarity in the totalitarian state.

Anti-market reaction

Why did the North Korean government decide to carry out this self-defeating currency move' Fathoming the minds of its reclusive leaders is a difficult exercise, but the most plausible explanation is that it was an anti-market reaction. Fearful of losing control, the regime apparently wanted to nip in the bud the power of the nascent merchant class by destroying its savings. But the unintended consequences were instant shortages of basic provisions, surging inflation and an unprecedented public show of resentment against the regime--which, after all, claims that the country's citizens live in a communist paradise.

The currency redenomination was blatantly unfair to ordinary North Koreans. For each individual, only the first Won100,000 of the old currency was exchangeable at the ratio of 100:1. Above that threshold, the conversion rate was 1,000:1, rendering savings nearly worthless. (By some accounts, protests caused the ceiling to be raised to Won150,000, or perhaps Won500,000.) Even members of the elite, who by dint of their foreign currency holdings at first escaped the impact of redenomination, were not spared. From December 28th the authorities banned the use of foreign currency in domestic transactions, which in recent years has become widespread.

Return of barter

The hardest hit, however, were small merchants. A South Korean-based newspaper, the DailyNK, which has covert correspondents inside North Korea, reported in late January that barter is making a comeback, owing to uncertainty over prices and supplies. Such trade is done discreetly, at implicit prices based on those that prevailed before the new currency was introduced. According to Good Friends, a South Korean Buddhist organisation also with apparently good contacts inside the North, a kilogram of rice before the currency redenomination cost around Won2,000-2,200 (around US$14-15 at the official exchange rate, or 50-60 US cents at the unofficial market exchange rate) in Chongjin, a major east-coast city. After the redenomination the government set a new price of Won23/kg on December 9th, but by the end of that day the price had already doubled. By January 15th the price stood at Won240/kg, 11-12 times higher than before the redenomination.

Good Friends has also tracked the market exchange rate of the new won against the US dollar, this time in the north-western border city of Sinuiju, which abuts Dandong in China. In December the rate in Sinuiju began at Won38:US$1, strengthening to Won30:US$1 by December 22nd. Then came the ban on the use of foreign currency in domestic transactions, with a decreed exchange rate of Won3:US$1. However, this rate has proved illusory, and by late January the new currency's value against the dollar had plummeted to around Won300:US$1.

Looming crisis?

The execution of Mr Pak, if confirmed, would make it clear that the North Korean regime realises it made a mistake with the currency reshuffle and is trying to deflect the blame from the ruling Kim clan. Though there is no evidence that their two-generation grip on power is in jeopardy, they face several critical near-term challenges. The biggest is that Mr Kim, aged 68, is recovering from a stroke he suffered in 2008 and is in ill health. He has reportedly anointed his third son, Jong-un, who is still in his twenties and never been seen in public, as his successor. Some South Korean analysts speculate that the younger Kim may be formally introduced during the next session of the Supreme People's Assembly on April 9th, officially starting a lengthy period of transition (Kim Jong-il was the heir-apparent to his father, Kim Il-sung, North Korea's founder, for 14 years). But if the elder Kim were to die suddenly before the process takes root, it is unclear whether the regime would rally around his unproven son, raising a risk of instability.

The other grave challenge is the North's decrepit economy and the risk of greater popular unrest. After decades of mismanagement, there are multiple reports trickling out of the country that a growing number of its citizens is losing faith in the leadership. Starvation is again said to be rising due to a poor harvest in 2009 and dwindling foreign assistance in the face of Kim Jong-il's continued nuclear provocations (the North tested its second nuclear device in May 2009, and the multilateral talks to remove its nuclear threat remain suspended). At the same time, the regime's carefully constructed information quarantine is being breached increasingly frequently, as more people slip into China, use illicit mobile phones or watch copied South Korean DVDs. Many North Koreans are now aware that the outside world is very different from the dour society the Kim regime has constructed. In a report published on January 20th, the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), South Korea's leading state think-tank on the North, speculated that Mr Kim might not survive beyond 2012. It went on to say that a military coup, riots, massacres, a huge exodus or even a limited war could not be ruled out. The latter may be an overblown scenario. But it emphasises that developments in North Korea pose substantial risks for regional security.

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中國國民黨的「德政」—奉令四萬元比一元折成新台幣

http://taiwanyes.ning.com/group/Taiwaner/forum/topics/1970702:Topic...

http://www.taiwantribune.com/op-ed/2009/01/16/2234p04-1/

這張10萬元的舊台幣在上海印製，運返台灣時，舊台幣已被新台幣取代

日治時期通行於台灣的10元台灣銀行券，與10元日圓等值

這一張60億圓紙幣，1949年5月10日由中華民國政府的新疆省銀行發行，是中國歷史上面額最大的紙幣。當時，國民政府發行的貨幣與新疆地方貨幣折價共同流通使用。在這張鈔票上，印有”折合金圓券壹萬圓”。按當時上海一石米的價格是金圓券4.4億元計算，這張60億圓紙幣只能買到88粒米。